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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 














No. 12 C 750
Chief Judge Ruben CastilloCHIPOTLE MEXICAN GRILL, INC.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDFR
Tubonimi Bob-Manue] brings this action against Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., alleging 
employment discrimination on the basis of race and national origin and retaliation in violation of 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e elseg. (“Title VII”), and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (“Section 1981”); discrimination on the basis of age and retaliation in violation of the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 el (the “ADEA”); discrimination 
on the basis of disability and retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 12101 e ,seq. (the “ADA”); and retaliatory discharge in violation of Illinois state law. 
Presently before the Court is Defendant’s motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Defendant’s 
motion in part and denies it in part.
RELEVANT FACTS1
Plaintiff is a fifty-five-year-old black, Nigerian-born, United States citizen. (PL’s Rule
56.1 Resp. m  42-44.) Defendant is a chain of “fast casual” restaurants that specializes in
thC faCtS ? ° m the parties’ statements of material facts. (R 83 D ef’s Local
Facts ( Pl^s Rule^b T  R11 IT  (“D e f’S FaCtS”); R ’ 96’ P 1 ’s Respon’se to Def.’ s
Facts (“P ’S L t s ”) L d  R i o )  n  f ’ p S Rum 5<U(b)(3)(C) Smcmcm  of Material u s t 1-1. s facts ), and R. 103, Def. s Response to Pl.’s Facts (“Def.’s Rule 56.1 Resp.”).)
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Mexican fare. (Id 1 1.) Defendant operates a restaurant located at 1128 Lake Street in Oak 
Park, Illinois (the “Oak Park Restaurant”), where Plaintiff worked from November 16, 2008, 
until his termination on March 11, 2011. (Id. ^ 1 ,1 0 ,  41.)
Each of Defendant’s restaurants is operated by a set of crew members who are 
responsible for preparing and cooking food, assembling customer orders, cleaning and 
maintaining the restaurant, serving customers, and other similar tasks. (Id. 1 2.) All crew 
members are at-will employees. (Id.) Crew members work in three primary work areas: Grill, 
Prep, and Line. (Id f  9.) Grill and Prep are stations in the back of the restaurant, and crew 
members at these stations are required to maintain proper food handling, safety, and sanitation 
standards while preparing food; follow recipes; exhibit a cheerful and helpful manner; display a 
positive and enthusiastic approach to all assignments; and develop positive working relationships 
with all restaurant personnel. (Id 18.) The Line involves all the positions in the front of the 
restaurant, which are divided into the tortilla, salsa, expeditor, and cashier stations. (Id. f  9.) 
Crew members are assisted and managed by four levels of management (listed in ascending 
order of responsibility): Kitchen Manager, Service Manager, Apprentice Manager, and General 
Manager. (Id. If 3.) The General Manager is responsible for making all employment and 
operational decisions in the restaurant, including deciding who to hire and fire, deciding who to 
promote and train, and scheduling employees. (Id 14.) The General Manager is supervised by 
an Area Manager, whose duties include overseeing a number of restaurants and helping those 
restaurants reach their goals. (Id. ]f 3.)
I- Plaintiff s First Four Months of Employment
General Manager Robert Ruggiero, a Caucasian male, and Apprentice Manager Oscar 
O’Campo, a Hispanic male, interviewed and hired Plaintiff on November 16, 2008, as a crew
2
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member. (Id f  10.) Plaintiff alleges that he was specifically hired as a general manager trainee 
on a fast-track to management. (Id.-Def.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. f  26.) Joe Kersjes, a twenty-seven- 
year-old Caucasian male, was hired on November 22, 2008, as a Service Manager. (Pl.’s Rule
56.1 Resp. f  46.) Both Plaintiff and Kersjes initially trained together with Ruggiero, and they 
worked frequently together in the back of the restaurant. (Def.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. t 27.) Within a 
few weeks, however, Ruggiero discontinued Plaintiffs training while continuing to train Kersjes. 
(Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. t  45.) Plaintiff remained almost exclusively in the back of the restaurant, 
frequently washing dishes, while Kersjes rotated to other stations. (Def.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. | 28.) 
Kersjes was promoted to Apprentice Manager at the Elmhurst, Illinois Restaurant on April 27, 
2009. (Id. 129.) Plaintiff alleges that Ruggiero stopped training him because of his race, 
national origin, and age. (Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. If 45.) Plaintiff admits, however, that he never 
heard Ruggiero make any comments regarding Plaintiffs race, national origin, or age. (Id. f  47.) 
Plaintiff also alleges that O’Campo treated him differently based on his race, national origin, and 
age by making him wash dishes and take out the garbage by himself, by keeping him in the food 
preparation area, and by refusing to cross-train him. (Id. f  48.) Plaintiff admits, however, that 
washing dishes, taking out garbage, and working in the food preparation area are all 
responsibilities of a Prep employee. (Id.) He also admits that he never heard O’Campo make 
any comments about his race, national origin, or age. (Id. 49.)
II. Plaintiffs Performance Issues
Ruggiero was Plaintiff s General Manager for the first four and a half months of 
Plaintiffs employment. (Id. t i l . )  After Ruggiero left, Jeanine Cruz Chavez, a Caucasian 
female, became the General Manager of the Oak Park Restaurant and supervised Plaintiff until 
October 17, 2010. (Id. 1 15.) Area Manager Vicky Kubicki, a Caucasian female, was Chavez’s
3
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supervisor during Plaintiff s employment. (Id. f  16.) On June 1,2009, Chavez recorded in 
Plaintiffs Development Journal that he needed to work on perfecting his procedure because he 
made mistakes that would not happen if he took his time, and that he needed to work on 
completing all Prep tasks by 6:00 p.m. and getting out by 11:00 p.m. (Id. f  20.) On June 15, 
2009, Plaintiff allegedly received his first written warning (a “Performance Discussion”), stating 
that on June 13th, he made a batch of guacamole but did not cover it with two lawyers of plastic 
as he was trained to do; as a result, the guacamole had to be disposed of. (Id. |  21.) Plaintiff 
denies that the guacamole incident occurred and he denies receiving the Performance Discussion. 
(M.) In fact, Plaintiff denies receiving any of the five Performance Discussions that were in his 
personnel file. (Def.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. f  15.) Performance Discussions are supposed to be given 
to employees m a face-to-face meeting and the manager is supposed to confirm receipt, yet none 
of Plaintiff s Performance Discussions were signed by either Plaintiff or a manager. (Id. Iflf 14­
15.) Michael Triola, the Human Resources Director for the Central Region, admitted that 
Plaintiff may have never received the Performance Discussions in his file. (Id. ]f 15.)
In 2009, Plaintiff failed to report to work for a scheduled shift on nine occasions. (Pl.’s 
Rule 56.1 Resp. f  24.) Plaintiff alleges that the schedules posted were not always the final 
schedule and that Chavez scheduled him to work on days he had requested off due to doctors’ 
appointments. (Id.) Chavez also testified that sometimes the schedules changed after they were 
made. (Id.) An undated, unsigned performance review in Plaintiffs file rated Plaintiffs 
performance in the categories of food, equipment, and customer service as “needs 
improvement,” which is the lowest possible rating. (Id. 27.)
In January 2010, Chavez told Julia Kim, Human Resource Generalist, that Plaintiff was 
not meeting his job expectations and was a low performer. (Id. Tf 25.) After reviewing Plaintiffs
4
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Development Journal, Performance Discussions, and performance reviews, Kim advised Chavez 
to have an honest conversation with Plaintiff about expectations on a weekly basis, and then 
later, on a daily basis. (Id f  26.) Erica Arrington, an Apprentice Manager, noted Plaintiffs 
performance issues in the Oak Park Restaurant’s Dear Diary2 on several occasions in early 2010: 
on February 13th she noted that Plaintiff struggled to keep up with Prep and dishes; on March 
4th she noted that Plaintiff did not complete Prep and started marinating a steak at 10:50 p.m. 
even though he was told not to; on March 25th she noted that Plaintiff needed help closing Prep, 
did not take any garbage out until closing, and had trouble keeping pace with dishes, and that she 
found an object in steak he marinated. (Id. ]f 28.)
In Plaintiffs second performance review, dated April 2010, he received a “needs 
improvement” rating in the categories of food, equipment, and customer service. (Id. f 30.) 
Triola reviewed a draft of this review, which Chavez had prepared, and suggested changing 
whatever appeared “inconsistent” or could be seen as “picking” on Plaintiff. (Def.’s Rule 56.1 
Resp. t1f 20-21.) For example, with regard to the food category, Triola said he “would like to see 
specific examples that we can back up with documentation.” (Id If 21.) The version of the 
evaluation Plaintiff received contained many more details about Plaintiffs performance 
problems than the version Chavez originally drafted. (Id. f  22.) For instance, the evaluation 
recounted one incident where Plaintiff had allegedly lost two cases of chicken due to improper 
rotating in February 2010. (Id. If 23.) Plaintiff and Arrington testified that the cases of chicken 
had gone bad, and when Arrington called Chavez to inform her of this, Chavez told Arrington to 
have Plaintiff marinate the chicken anyway. (Id.) But Arrington and Plaintiff agreed that it 
would be unsafe to prepare the chicken, so they threw it away. (Id.) Chavez denied that she
ann th Stal ranf S " u6ar r?iary” is a b°°k that Defendanf s managers use to communicate with one 
another about anything that was going on in the restaurant. (Def.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. J 49.)
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instructed Arrington and Plaintiff to marinate the chicken. (Id.) Kubicki testified that she and 
Chavez discussed the review with Plaintiff, but Plaintiff denies having participated in such a 
discussion. (Id. ) In October 2010, Plaintiff received his third performance review, in which he 
received an overall rating of “meets expectations,” but continued to be rated as “needs 
improvement” in the food category. (Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. f  32.)
On November 8, 2010, Panithan “Sai” Thanawutthikom, an Asian male, became General 
Manager of the Oak Park Restaurant. (Id. 135.) On November 19, 2010, Plaintiff received an 
evaluation of meets expectations,” and following this evaluation, he received his first and only 
pay increase. (Def.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. 137.) On December 23, 2010, Plaintiff received a 
Performance Discussion for his tardiness, which stated: “Bob was 15 mins late and did not call. 
12/21/10 Bob was 15 mins late but did not call. . .  at 8:15 to let us know that he will be in at 
8:30.” (Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. 136.) Plaintiff was warned: “Please do not be late again. This will 
be the last write up.” (Id.) Plaintiff denies that he was late those days, and he denies receiving 
the Performance Discussion. (Id.) Plaintiffs time sheet indicates that on December 21,2010, he 
clocked in at 8:14 a.m. (Id.) Defendant alleges that Plaintiff reported to work six or more 
minutes late 32 times between June 8, 2009 and December 23, 2010. (Id. f 37.) Plaintiff denies 
these allegations and states that the schedules posted were not always the final schedule. (Id.) 
Plaintiffs time sheets also indicate that on eleven occasions when Plaintiff allegedly committed
a violation of Defendant’s policies or procedures, he was not at work. (Def.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. |  
13.)
Kubicki visited the Oak Park Restaurant between once a week and once a month on 
average and observed Plaintiff on multiple occasions. (Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. ^ 17.) Kubicki 
observed issues with Plaintiffs performance: he failed to clean his dish area, washed dishes with
6
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dirty water, and repeatedly violated food safety standards when he placed chicken and camitas 
on the same table. (Id.) Kubicki also noted Plaintiffs repeated failure to complete tasks in a 
timely manner. (Id. ) Kubicki described Plaintiff s performance as “never satisfactory.” (Id. f  
18.) She testified that he would argue with anyone who gave him any constructive feedback, 
including herself. (Id.) She also stated that crew members and managers were afraid of him 
because of his explosive and condescending demeanor. (Id.)
Plaintiff denies Kubicki’s allegation that his performance was never satisfactory. (Id.) 
Kim testified that Defendant considered Plaintiff s performance to be satisfactory in his 
November 2010 review. (Id.) Arrington testified that Plaintiff was the “Ace in his Place” for 
Prep, meaning he was assigned to that station during peak hours because he was the strongest 
employee in that position. (Id.) Plaintiff also denies Kubicki’s allegation that Plaintiff would 
argue with anyone who gave him constructive feedback and that crew members and managers 
were afraid of him. (Id.) Arrington testified that Plaintiff never frightened her and that she 
enjoyed working with him, as he was always professional and polite. (Id.) Arrington also 
testified that Plaintiff was open to feedback if it was constructive, but that Kubicki’s and 
Chavez’s feedback was not constructive. (Id. f  19.) Arrington and Arlene Guerrero, a Service 
Manager, testified that Plaintiff was a team player, competent employee, and a hard worker. 
(Def. s Rule 56.1 Resp. 1 36.) Plaintiff always offered his assistance to anyone who needed it 
when Arrington was a manager. (Id.) He went “above and beyond,” and was a mentor to 
Arrington and Guerrero. (Id.)
III. Events Surrounding Plaintiffs Termination
Thanawutthikom took an eight-week leave of absence in early March 2011, and 
Apprentice Manager Veronica Garcia, a Hispanic female, became the acting General Manager
7
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for the Oak Park Restaurant. (PI.’s Rule 56.1 Resp.138.) Garcia reported to Kubicki that she 
had three conversations with Plaintiff because he refused to wear gloves and was eating food 
while preparing food, which were both violations of Defendant’s and Illinois’s food safety 
policies and grounds for termination under Defendant’s policies. (Id. ) Plaintiff denies that he 
ate while preparing food. (Id.) On March 4, 2011, the Oak Park Restaurant management team 
called and emailed Kubicki with concerns about Plaintiffs attitude and food safety violations.
(Id. f  39.) The email stated that Plaintiff was not respectful in the workplace; that he left a soiled 
towel on the prep table when the health inspector was inspecting the restaurant on February 28, 
2011, that Thanawutthikom asked Plaintiff to not eat while prepping on March 1, 2011; that 
Garcia saw Plaintiff eating bell peppers while cutting them, asked him to not eat while prepping 
food, and Plaintiff asked her “what am I eating?” on March 4, 2011; that Garcia found a soiled 
towel on the prep table again on March 4, 2011; and that when Garcia asked Plaintiff to check 
the dining room and dishes on March 4th, Plaintiff became angry and began throwing dishes and 
using profanity, including “fuck this shit.” (Id.)
Plaintiff denies that these incidents occurred, and his time sheet indicates that he was not 
at work on March 4, 2011. (Id. ) Guerrero testified that she never saw Plaintiff leave a soiled 
towel in the prep area, but that it was done all the time by other employees. (Def.’s Rule 56.1 
Resp. t  56.) She stated that other employees did not follow procedures all the time, but no one 
else’s errors w^ e  documented as frequently as Plaintiffs. (Id.) Guerrero believed she may have 
written up Plaintiff for an incident where Plaintiff was eating a bell pepper while prepping food, 
but she did not remember if she saw him eating the bell pepper. (Id. 157.) She testified that she 
would not have documented the incident but for Kubicki’s instruction to document everything 
Plaintiff did. (Id. ) Arrington testified that it was frequent for employees at the Oak Park
8
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Restaurant to use profanity and that Plaintiff swore less often than other employees. (Id. f  58.) 
Neither Arrington nor Guerrero were aware of any employees being disciplined for using 
profanity. (Id.) Although the memorandum that accompanied Plaintiffs termination stated that 
Guerrero heard Plaintiff say “God damn it,” she testified that she never heard Plaintiff use 
profanity or saw him throw dishes or be insubordinate. (Id.)
Kubicki forwarded the March 4, 2011 email to Triola, seeking advice on how to handle 
Plaintiffs behavior. (PL’s Rule 56.1 Resp. 140.) Kubicki testified that Triola instructed her to 
initiate Plaintiffs termination and sent her a termination memorandum that summarized 
Plaintiffs behavior as described in the March 4th email. (Id; Def.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. f  59.) 
Kubicki agreed that Plaintiff s behavior warranted termination and carried out Plaintiffs 
termination on March 11, 2011. (Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. 40-41.) Triola admitted that he was 
involved m drafting Plaintiffs termination memorandum, but he testified that Kubicki made the 
decision to terminate Plaintiff and that he did not provide any advice as to whether Plaintiff 
should be terminated. (Def.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. ^ 60.) Kubicki testified that Plaintiff was 
terminated based on the incidents described in the termination memorandum and on his overall 
performance. (Id. 1f 61.) Triola testified that Plaintiff was terminated for insubordination only, 
not for performance reasons. (Id.) The position statement Defendant submitted to the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) stated that Plaintiff was terminated for 
unexcused absences, poor performance, inability to meet Defendant’s reasonable expectations, 
violations of Defendant’s Food Safety Policies and Procedures, and insubordination. (Id.)
IV. Plaintiffs Allegations of Race, National Origin, and Age Discrimination
Plaintiff alleges that Chavez treated him differently based on his race, national origin, 
age, and disability by keeping him in the kitchen/preparation area, making him wash dishes,
9
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making him take out the garbage alone, failing to train or promote him, excessively
micromanaging him, making derogatory comments, humiliating him, cutting his hours after he
requested an accommodation based on his disability, and denying him a raise. (PL’s Rule 56.1
Resp. 150.) Chavez micromanaged Plaintiff by standing over him and watching him complete
tasks that he knew how to do, like marinating meat. (Def.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. 1 5.) She also
examined the avocado peels in the garbage to check to see if Plaintiff had wasted any avocado,
and she checked the size of the lettuce that Plaintiff had cut. {Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Chavez
called him “Bobo,” which he did not like. (PL’s Rule 56.1 Resp. 151.) Plaintiff also alleges that
Chavez made fun of his accent. (Def.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. 12.) On one occasion, after Chavez
terminated Chase Wright, an African-American employee, she told Plaintiff, “Bob you’re a
survivor. I’ve been wanting to fire you.” {Id 13.) Arrington, who was present for this
comment, heard Chavez make a substantially similar statement. {Id.) On another occasion,
Chavez asked Plaintiff whether he was getting ready to retire. {Id. f  4.) Arrington stated that
Chavez showed a preference for younger workers because she believed they could work faster. 
{Id.)
Arrington testified that Chavez told Lloyd Jones, a newly-hired African-American 
employee, “I hope you don’t get mad, but I like to make black jokes.” {Id. f  9.) Soon after, with 
Arrington’s assistance, Jones transferred to Defendant’s Elmhurst Restaurant. {Id.) Chavez 
made comments about Arrington’s half African-American daughter, such as “why would you 
have your baby with an afro,” and “what is wrong with her hair?” {Id. f  10.) Plaintiff alleges 
that racism was rampant at the Oak Park Restaurant, and that it was because of this that Chavez 
held a mandatory meeting where she stated that discrimination against African-Americans would 
not be tolerated. (PL’s Rule 56.1 Resp. 151.) Chavez was terminated after two employees
10
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complained that she made derogatory comments about African-Americans, but Defendant denies 
that those complaints were the basis for her termination. (Def.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. f 12.)
To be promoted to Kitchen Manager, a crew member must be proficient and cross-trained 
on all areas in the back of the restaurant (i.e. Grill and Prep) and know and follow all procedures. 
(Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. Tf 33.) Defendant alleges that Plaintiff was never promoted to Kitchen 
Manager because he was not cross-trained on all areas of the kitchen. (Id. f  34.) Plaintiff alleges 
that he was denied training that had been promised to him at the time of his hire. (Id. ) Arrington 
witnessed the training Plaintiff received both at the beginning of his employment and after his 
initial management training was stopped. (Def.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. 1 30.) Arrington testified that 
Plaintiff was trained on the line sporadically and when there was a line out the door, which made 
it difficult for him to be successful. (Id) Chavez told Arrington that Plaintiff was not going to 
be promoted. (Id. 1J1.) Plaintiff alleges that Arrington was promoted over him. (Pl.’s Rule 56.1 
Resp. 152.) Arrington was promoted to Kitchen Manager on September 14, 2009, after 
receiving a performance review on April 26, 2009, indicating that she met expectations in every 
category; she was promoted to Service Manager on November 9, 2009. (Id.; Def.’s Rule 56.1 
Resp. 6.)
Plaintiff also alleges that Ryan Haydon was promoted over him. (Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. f  
53.) Haydon, a thirty-year-old Caucasian male, was hired on November 3, 2009, and was 
promoted to Kitchen Manager on May 10, 2010, after receiving a performance review of “above 
expectations” in all categories. (Id.) David Resendiz, a twenty-four-year-old Hispanic male, 
was hired on May 20, 2009, as a crew member; although he was never promoted, he was made a 
Kitchen Manager-in-training, a position that precedes a promotion to Kitchen Manager. (Id. If 
55; Def.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. 132.) Arrington observed the training that Haydon and Resendiz
11
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received and testified that she, Haydon, and Resendiz were trained on virtually all the stations 
and received more training and resources than Plaintiff. (Def.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. |  31.)
Arrington testified that she believes that Plaintiff would have been capable of being a Service 
Manager if he had been given the same tools, resources, and support as other employees. {Id.)
Plaintiff also alleges that Kristina Rodriguez was hired after him and was promoted over 
him. (PI. s Rule 56.1 Resp. 54.) Rodriguez, a twenty-seven-year-old Hispanic female, was 
hired on July 11, 2006, at a Chipotle in Kansas, was promoted to Kitchen Manager on September 
28, 2009, in Kansas, and then was transferred to the Oak Park Restaurant on October 5, 2009. 
{Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that Maria Guerrero was promoted over him. {Id. |  56.) Maria 
Guerrero, a twenty-five-year-old Hispanic female, was hired on November 2, 2007, at the River 
North Restaurant and was promoted to Kitchen Manager on September 24, 2012, more than a 
year after Plaintiffs termination. {Id.)
During the time Plaintiff was employed at the Oak Park Restaurant, seven Hispanics, five 
Caucasians, and five African-Americans were terminated for unacceptable work performance; 
two Hispanics were terminated for insubordination; and one Caucasian and one multi-racial 
individual were terminated for violating company rules. {Id. 157.)
V. Plaintiffs Health Issues
Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from a congenital heart disorder, retinopathy, kidney 
disease, hypertension, and an inguinal hernia. {Id. f  58.) Plaintiff alleges that his congenital 
heart disorder made him tired and made it impracticable for him to function as a normal, healthy 
person. (Id. 59.) Defendant alleges that Plaintiff s heart is normal and not diseased because 
computed tomography scans of his chest revealed no acute cardiopulmonary disease and 
echocardiograms revealed normal systolic function and no regional wall abnormalities. {Id. 1
12
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60.) On March 27, 2013, Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Matilda Malm at John H. Stroger Jr. 
Hospital (“Stroger Hospital”) who indicated that his chest pains were unlikely cardiac-related; he 
was treated for gastroesophageal reflux disease. (Id.; R. 89-8, Ex. Ill, PL’s Stroger Hospital 
Medical Records at 1-2.)
Plaintiff alleges that his eye disorder prevents him from driving, causes migraines, and 
prevents him from reading voluminous materials. (Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. 161.) When Plaintiff 
was first diagnosed with an eye disorder, in or around September 2010, he could not see out of 
his right eye. (Def.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. If 66.) In September and October 2010, Plaintiff s vision 
problem was treated by Dr. Jeff Wongskhaluang, a senior resident in ophthalmology at Stroger 
Hospital. (PI. s Rule 56.1 Resp. % 62.) Dr. Wongskhaluang concluded that Plaintiffs vision 
probably did not limit his ability to work and that he was able to serve food on the line, prepare 
food in the kitchen, marinate and cut or shred meat, clean the dining room, and read. (Pl.’s Rule
56.1 Resp. f t  62-64; R. 89-9, Ex. JJJ, Wongskhaluang Dep. at 37:7-39:05.) Plaintiff complained 
of discomfort when driving at night, so Dr. Wongskhaluang recommended that Plaintiff refrain 
from driving at night. (Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. f  63.) Plaintiff informed Defendant that he had an 
eye disease and provided Defendant with a doctor’s note stating that Plaintiff had “decreased 
vision especially at night and should not be driving at night.” (Def.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. f  67.) 
Plaintiffs hours were reduced after he informed Chavez that he could not drive at night. (Id f  
71.) Chavez told Plaintiff that she would schedule Plaintiff when she could, but “wasn’t going to 
change the whole schedule around for one person.” (Id)
Defendant alleges that in May 2010, Plaintiff called off from work informing Kubicki 
that “they” had found a kidney match and he needed to be tested to make sure it was compatible.
(Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. 165.) Plaintiff denies telling Kubicki this. (Id.) Sometime in 2012, after
13
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Plaintiffs termination, he was treated for a kidney disease by Dr. Albert Osei at Stroger 
Hospital. (Id. 1i 66.) Dr. Osei determined from reviewing Plaintiffs medical ftle that Plaintiffs 
kidneys had not failed and were functioning properly. (Id.) Dr. Osei characterized PlaintifTs 
kidney disease as “not that severe.” (Id.) Plaintiff had no physical limitations due to his kidney 
disease; the only implications of the kidney disease were limits on the amount of salt, 
phosphorus, potassium, and non-steroidal anti-inflammatories PlaintifTcould consume. (Id.)
Plaintiff has been treated by Dr. Osei at Stroger Hospital for his hypertension since 2007. 
(Id. 167.) Dr. Osei testified that Plaintiff had no limitations at work due to hypertension, and 
that lifting would not affect Plaintiffs blood pressure. (Id. H 67.) Dr. Osei did not consider 
PlaintifTs hypertension to be severe. (Id.) Plaintiffwas also treated at Stroger Hospital by Dr. 
Michael Davidovich, a general internist, on two occasions, once in April 2009 and once in 
September 2010. (Id. 168; R. 90-1, Ex. MMM, Davidovich Dep. at 9:17-21.) Dr. Davidovich 
noted no limitations caused by PlaintifTs hypertension and kidney disease, and only
recommended that Plaintiff exercise as much as possible and eat a low-sodium diet. (Pl.’s Rule 
56.1 Resp. 68.)
Plaintiff alleges he was diagnosed with a hernia in 2009 and was restricted to lifting no
more than ten pounds. (Id. If 69.) Plaintiff alleges that his hernia made it very difficult for him
to lift and that lifting heavy items caused him extreme pain. (Def.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. If 65.)
Plaintiff informed his managers of the lifting restriction at the time of his diagnosis and
requested that someone else lift heavy items and take out the garbage. (Id.) Kubicki testified
that Chavez told her that Plaintiff would, at times, refuse help and violate his lifting restrictions.
( s Rule 56.1 Resp. f  69.) Plaintiffs hernia was surgically repaired on February 28, 2013.
(Id. 1 70.)
14
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On one occasion, on an unspecified date, Plaintiff alleges that he gave Chavez a note 
from his doctor and Chavez told him that he was terminated. (Def.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. 169.) 
Plaintiff asked to speak with someone in Human Resources, and Chavez called Kubicki, who 
told Chavez that she could not terminate Plaintiff. (Id.) Chavez burst out of her office, yelling 
expletives and saying, “I can’t believe this. I can’t get rid of this guy for nothing.” (Id ) Plaintiff 
alleges that Chavez told him, “You’re sick a lot, I don’t think this job is for you,” and that she 
told him on several occasions that he was too sick to work for Defendant. (Id. 170.) Chavez 
denied telling Plaintiff that he was sick a lot and too sick to work for Defendant. (Id)
Amngton testified that on some occasions, Chavez threw away doctors’ notes Plaintiff had 
provided, claiming that she did not need them. (Id. 174.) Chavez stated that she did not throw 
away any of Plaintiff’s doctors’ notes and instead placed all of the notes in his file. (Id.)
When an employee of Defendant has a medical condition which requires an
accommodation, the employee is to bring it to the attention of his General Manager. (Id. 172.)
Documentation of accommodations is kept in the employee’s confidential file. (Id.) The Area
Manager and the Human Resources Department are, under Defendant’s policy, always involved
in responding to an employee’s request for accommodation; however, Kubicki could not
remember if she discussed with Plaintiff what accommodations he might need. (Id. 1 73.) On
January 11, 2011, Kubicki told Triola that Plaintiff had not provided documentation of his need 
for accommodations. (Id)
VI. Plaintiffs Complaints about Discriminatory Treatment
Plaintiff alleges that he complained to O’Campo, Chavez, and Human Resource 
Generalist Esther Smiley in late 2009 to early 2010 regarding Chavez's management team 
cutting his hours, setting unrealistic time expectations, prohibiting breaks, micromanaging him,
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failing to accommodate his medical restrictions, and failing to train or promote him, and their 
discriminatory, harassing, and retaliatory behavior against him. (Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. 1 71.) 
Plaintiff alleges he made similar complaints to Kim in early 2010. {Id.) Defendant denies that 
Plaintiff complained to Kim that Defendant failed to accommodate his medical restrictions. 
(Def.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. f  40.) After Chavez learned that Plaintiff had complained to Human 
Resources, she told Arrington and other managers that she was “pissed” at Plaintiff for going to 
Human Resources and instructed them to document every little thing Plaintiff did wrong, even if 
it was coming in to work one minute late. {Id. If 42.) Arrington testified that Chavez “plotted” 
against Plaintiff, and that she had more than twenty conversations in which Chavez said that she 
wanted Plaintiff fired because he had complained. (Id. 1 43.) Chavez denies plotting against 
Plaintiff. (Id.)
Kim conducted an investigation of Plaintiff s complaints beginning in February 2010. 
(Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. ]f 74.) As part of her investigation, Kim interviewed Plaintiff, 
management, and crew members. (Id.) Some of the crew members told her that Plaintiff did not 
always greet or address coworkers when arriving to work, fell behind easily, often needed help 
closing, and took playful banter between the crew too seriously. (Id; R. 97-1, Ex. 8, Kim Dep. 
at 189:10-22.) After interviewing and investigating Plaintiffs complaints, Kim alleged that she 
saw no signs of discrimination or harassment. (Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. % 74.) Kim determined that 
Plaintiff was not meeting expectations, following procedures, working with a sense of urgency, 
or communicating with his team. (Id.) Kim also investigated whether Plaintiffs hours had been 
drastically cut and learned that Plaintiff requested days off due to his doctor appointments but 
expected to receive full-time hours by being scheduled on every day that he had not requested 
off, a request that Chavez could not accommodate without sufficient notice. (Id. f  75; R. 97-1,
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Ex. 8, Kim Dep. at 220:23-223:19.) Arrington testified that Plaintiff was one of the few 
employees who informed managers of his doctor appointments weeks in advance. (Pl.’s Rule
56.1 Resp. 1 75.)
Plaintiff complained to Kim that Chavez refused to accommodate his lifting restrictions, 
and he requested to meet with then-Area Manager Jacob Sumner. (Def.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. 1 46.) 
On February 25, 2010, Sumner, Chavez, and Arrington met with Plaintiff to discuss his 
complaints. (Id. ) Plaintiff alleges that Sumner apologized for lapses and inconsistencies in his 
training, told Plaintiff “we dropped the ball on your training,” and instructed Chavez to cross­
train Plaintiff and abide by his medical restrictions. (Id. ) After the meeting with Sumner, 
Arrington saw Plaintiff lifting garbage (weighing up to 50 or 60 pounds), cases of steak 
(weighing approximately 30 pounds), and cases of lettuce (weighing approximately 30 pounds). 
(Id. If 77.) Guerrero also saw Plaintiff carrying garbage and dishes (weighing 10 to 20 pounds) 
without any help. (Id. )
Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC on March 5, 2010. (Id. f 44.) 
Plaintiff gave Chavez a copy of the EEOC Charge. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that after he filed his 
EEOC Charge, he was micromanaged more often and it was impossible for him to take breaks. 
(Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. 76.) Plaintiff alleges that Chavez required him to sit with her for as 
much as ninety minutes per shift, which caused him to fall behind on his prep. (Def.’s Rule 56.1 
Resp. If 50.) Chavez also forced Plaintiff to work on the line at the busiest times of the day 
without training. (Id. f^ 51.) Defendant alleges that Chavez spent more time with Plaintiff 
attempting to train him properly and prepare him for future development and cross training, as 
Chavez was instructed to do. (Id.) Chavez testified that the training she gave Plaintiff was not 
the cause of him falling behind on his prep. (Id.)
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Arrington testified that when Chavez learned about Plaintiffs EEOC Charge, she freaked
out and ranted about it and said that Plaintiff “had to go.” (Id  145.) Chavez denied that she said
Plaintiff had to go. (Id) Kubicki told Arrington and Guerrero to document any incident
involving Plaintiff, and she told Gueirero that Plaintiff had filed a lawsuit against Defendant.
(Id. 153.) Arrington testified that Defendant’s managers were “looking for stuff’ on Plaintiff to
document. (Id 154.) Guerrero testified that Plaintiff was under the microscope and that it was
“ridiculous documenting everything” because they did not do that with any other employee. (Id
155.) Managers typically write in employees’ Development Journals every month, and in the
eleven months that Chavez had worked with Plaintiffbefore February 2010, managers had
written in Plaintiffs Development Journal five times. (Id 148.) Between February 27, 2010,
and March 23, 2010, however, Chavez and other manageis made six entries in Plaintiffs
Development Journal about Plaintiffs perfomtance errors. (Id 147.) In February and March
2010, there were 17 Dear Diary entries regarding Plaintiffs alleged performance problems. (Id
149.) After March 2010, there were no additional Dear Diary entries regarding Plaintiff until 
December 2010. (Id)
After Plaintiff filed his EEOC Charge, Kim offered to transfer him to a different
restaurant, but Plaintiff declined the offer. (Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Resp f  76.) Plaintiff alleges that he
declined the offer because he felt that transferring would simply have a “Band-Aid effect” rather
than solving the problem of discrimination at the Oak Park Restaurant. (Id.) Kim alleges that
she investigated but did not find any change in treatment towards Plaintiff by the management
team after he filed his first complaint. (Id.) Kim testified that after Plaintiff filed his EEOC
Charge, Triola took over the investigation from her, and her involvement in Plaintiffs case 
ended. (Id.)
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Triola monitored Plaintiffs performance after he filled his EEOC charge. (Def.’s Rule
56.1 Resp. Tf 63.) One of Triola’s responsibilities as Human Resources Director was to act as the 
liaison with outside counsel on EEOC charges, which included gathering documents and sending 
updates for complaining employees’ files. (Id. f  64.) On January 3, 2011, Triola asked Kubicki 
for Plaintiffs most recent Development Journal entries. (Id. f  63) On January 13, 2011, Triola 
told Kubicki he was working with Defendant’s attorney on drafting a Development Journal entry 
“to deal with the attendance issue” and that Defendant’s attorney would be interviewing Kubicki 
and Thanawutthikom “with the sense ‘this won’t end well with Bob’ -  we want to be prepared.” 
(Id.) On January 20, 2011, Triola asked Thanawutthikom to send Plaintiffs Development 
Journal, work schedules, and the Dear Diary to Defendant’s counsel. (Id.) On March 8, 2011, in 
response to Kubicki’s report that only one Development Journal entry had been completed since 
the beginning of the year, Triola responded, “Yah, not good.” (Id) Triola could not recall an 
employee other than Plaintiff for whom he continued to send records to outside counsel after 
Defendant filed a position statement with the EEOC. (Id. f 64.)
VII. Plaintiffs Workplace Injury
Plaintiff claims that he fell while taking out the garbage on December 23, 2010. (Id. < | f  
79.) Defendant alleges that Plaintiff first reported his injury to Thanawutthikom on December 
26, 2010. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he told Thanawutthikom about his injury the day it 
occurred. (Id; R. 97-1, Ex. 3, Pl.’s Dep. at 199:12-24.) Defendant alleges that Thanawutthikom 
informed Kubicki that he “went to call in the claim and [Plaintiff] told him he did not want him 
to. [Plaintiff] said he contacted his doctor and he diagnosed it over the phone as Sciatica and 
prescribed Vicodin.” (Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. f  79.) Plaintiff denies telling Thanawutthikom that 
he did not want him to call in the claim. (Id ; R. 97-1, Ex. 3, Pl.’s Dep. at 199:15-200:1.)
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Thanawutthikom reported the worker’s compensation claim on January 14, 2011. (Pl.’s Rule
56.1 Resp. 1 79.) Plaintiff was treated by Concentra Medical Center as a result of this claim and 
was diagnosed with a hip/thigh sprain/strain. (Id. f 80.) Defendant paid for Plaintiffs 
subsequent doctor’s visits and treatment. (Id.) The treating physician and physical therapist 
imposed restrictions on Plaintiffs activities, including lifting, prolonged standing/walking 
pushing/pulling, squatting, and climbing stairs/ladders. (Def.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. 78.)
Concentra faxed the documents to the restaurant and Plaintiff also gave them to 
Thanawutthikom. (Id.)
In early January 2011, Plaintiff complained to Kubicki that Thanawutthikom refused to 
accommodate his injury because Thanawutthikom was racist. (Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. f  77.) 
Kubicki alleges that she and her supervisor, Ed Berg, investigated Plaintiffs complaint and 
learned from Plaintiff that he respected Thanawutthikom and thought that he had improved the 
restaurant. (Id. ) Plaintiff denies telling Kubicki that he respected Thanawutthikom or thought 
that Thanawutthikom had improved the restaurant. (Id. ) Plaintiff alleges that because 
Thanawutthikom refused to accommodate his medical limitations, Plaintiffs treating physician 
told Defendant that Plaintiff could not work until he was released. (Def.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. f  79.) 
Plaintiff did not work from January 21, 2011 until February 9, 2011 as a result of his injury.
(Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. ]f 80.) On February 10, 2011, Plaintiff returned to working a normal 
schedule. (Id.) Upon his return, Plaintiff asked Thanawutthikom to be paid for the days he 
missed. (Def.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. f  80.) Plaintiff was discharged from treatment on or about 
February 25, 2011. (Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. ]j 80.)
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff initiated this action on February 2, 2012. (R. 1, Compl.) On January 15, 2013, 
Plaintiff filed his ten-count amended complaint. (R. 48, Am. Compl.) In Count I, Plaintiff 
alleges discrimination on the basis of race in violation of Title VII, {id. I f  33-38); in Count II, he 
alleges discrimination on the basis of national origin in violation of Title VII, {id. H  39-44); in 
Count III, he alleges discrimination on the basis of race, color, and ethnicity in violation of 
Section 1981, {id. H 45-49); in Count IV, he alleges retaliation in violation of Title VII, {id. H 
50-57); in Count V, he alleges discrimination on the basis of age in violation of the ADEA, {id.
1158-63); in Count VI, he alleges retaliatory discharge in violation of Illinois state law, {id. H 
64-69); m Count VII, he alleges retaliation in violation of the ADEA, {id H 70-76); in Count 
VIII, he alleges discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of the ADA, {id. H 77-83); 
in Count IX, he alleges failure to accommodate in violation of the ADA, {id. H 84-88); and in 
Count X, he alleges retaliation in violation of the ADA, {id. H 89-95). Defendant answered 
Plaintiffs amended complaint on January 21, 2013, (R. 50, Ans.), and moved for summary 
judgment on August 26, 2013, (R. 82, Def.’s Mot. Summ. J.). Plaintiff responded to Defendant’s 
motion for summary judgment on October 4, 2013, (R. 96, Pl.’s Resp.), and filed a corrected 
memorandum of law in opposition to summary judgment on October 9, 2013, (R. 101, Pl.’s
Mem.). Defendant replied to Plaintiffs memorandum in opposition to summary judgment on 
October 25, 2013. (R. 102, Def.’s Reply.)
LEGAL STANDARDS
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record shows that there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A disputed fact is ‘material' if it might affect the outcome of the suit under
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governing law.” Hampton v. Ford Motor Co., 561 F.3d 709, 713 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing 
And^son v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., A ll  U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A genuine issue of material fact 
exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 
party.” Anderson, A ll  U.S. at 248. In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact 
exists, the Court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party 
opposing the motion. Id. at 255; Omnicare, Inc. v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., 629 F.3d 697, 704 
(7th Cir. 2011) (“[District courts are not required to draw every requested inference; they must 
only draw reasonable ones that are supported by the record.”) The moving party has the initial 
burden of demonstrating that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, A ll  U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Wheeler v. Lawson, 539 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2008). The 
moving party “can prevail just by showing that the other party has no evidence on an issue on
which that party has the burden of proof.” Brazinski v. Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 6 F.3d 
1176, 1183 (7th Cir. 1993).
Once the moving party has met this burden, the nonmoving party must “come forward 
with specific facts demonstrating that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Wheeler, 539 F.3d at 
634. “The existence of a mere scintilla of evidence, however, is insufficient to fulfill this 
requirement. The nonmoving party must show that there is evidence upon which a jury 
reasonably could find for the plaintiff.” Id. (citing Anderson, A ll  U.S. at 251-52.) The 
nonmoving party may not rely on “mere conclusions and allegations” to create a genuinely 
disputed issue of material fact. Balderst on v. Fairbanks Morse Engine Div. o f  Codec Indus., 328 
F 3d 309’ 320 <7th Cir- 2003). Instead, the nonmoving party “must make a showing sufficient to 
establish any essential element of her cause of action for which she will bear the burden of 
persuasion at trial.” Smith ex rel. Smith v. Severn, 129 F.3d 419, 425 (7th Cir. 1997); also
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Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. Weighing evidence and making credibility decisions are jury 
functions, and it is not appropriate for a judge to assume those functions when ruling on a motion 
for summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Accordingly, the Court “appljies] the 
summary judgment standard with special scrutiny to employment discrimination cases, which
often turn on issues of intent and credibility.” Krchnavy v. Limagrain Genetics Carp., 294 F.3d 
871, 875 (7th Cir. 2002).
On summary judgment, the Court limits its analysis of the facts to the evidence that is 
presented in the parties’ Local Rule 56.1 statements. See Bordelon v. Chi. Sch. Reform Bd o f  
Trs., 233 F.3d 524, 529 (7th Cir. 2000) (referring to Local Rules 12(M) and (N), which were 
replaced by Local Rule 56). To adequately dispute a statement of fact, the opposing party must 
cite specific support in the record; an unsubstantiated denial or a denial that is mere argument or 
conjecture is not sufficient to create a genuinely disputed issue of material fact. Malec v.
191 RR-D- 581’ 585 ^ D- m - 200°); also Judson Atkinson Candies, Inc. v. Latini- 
Hohberger Dhimantec, 529 F.3d 371, 382 n.2 (7th Cir. 2008).
ANALYSIS
L Ra“ ’ NatiOI,al 0ri8i“’ a“d Age Discriminati»” Claims (Counts I, II, III,
In Counts I, II, III, and V, Plaintiff alleges that, in failing to promote or train him and in 
terminating his employment, Defendant discriminated against him based on his race, national 
origin, and age in violation ofTitle VII, Section 1981, and the ADEA. (R. 48, Am. Compl.
35,47,60.) Title VII and Section 1981 prohibit employers from discriminating against their 
employees on the basis of race or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l); 42 U.S.C. § 1981; 
see Patton v. Indianapolis Pub. Sch. Bd, 276 F.3d 334, 337-38 (7th Cir. 2002). Similarly, the 
ADEA prohibits employers from discriminating against their employees on the basis of age. 29
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U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). Discrimination claims under Title VII, Section 1981, and the ADEA are 
analyzed in the same manner, and this Court will thus analyze all three claims together. Alarms 
v. Perry, 520 F.3d 662, 671 (7th Cir. 2008); Patton, 276 F.3d at 338.
A plaintiff may prove discrimination under Title VII, Section 1981, and the ADEA 
through the direct or indirect methods of proof. At anus, 520 F.3d at 671 -Brewer v. Bd. ofTrs. o f 
Univ. o f  III., 479 F.3d 908, 915 (7th Cir. 2007).3 A plaintiff may prevail under the direct method 
of proof either by presenting direct evidence of intentional discrimination or “by constructing a 
‘convincing mosaic’ of circumstantial evidence that ‘allows a jury to infer intentional 
discrimination by the decision-maker.’” Rhodes v. III. Dep’t o f Tramp., 359 F.3d 498,. 504 (7th 
Cir. 2004) (quoting Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 737 (7th Cir. 1994)). If a 
plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence, the evidence “must point directly to a discriminatory 
reason for the employer’s action.” Id. (quoting Adams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 324 F.3d 935,
939 (7th Cir. 2003)). Circumstantial evidence that can form a convincing mosaic fall into three 
categories: (1) suspicious timing, ambiguous statements, “behavior toward or comments directed 
at other employees in the protected group, and other bits and pieces from which an inference of 
discriminatory intent might be drawn,” Troupe, 20 F.3d at 736; (2) evidence “that similarly 
situated employees were treated differently,” Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 860 (7th Cir.
la ? tL Sb u r f o r c ^ r  hfthh eH ^ t0 PT ail ^ the ADEA’ a Plaintiff must show that age 
U S ?67^ 8 0  o n Z  action. Gross v. FBI Fin. Servs., Inc., 557
ti, a ’ u80 20^ '  Post' Gmv>y’ the Seventh Circuit continues to apply the direct and indirect
604^(7th Che2oT2U“n8 ^ ^ a Fleishman v- Continental Cas. Co., 698 F.3d 598 
604 (7th Cir. 2012) ( we have continued to apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shiftine ’
framework m summary judgment cases that proceed under the indirecf method of proof t
2009frV HrOSA eXP n lt y ld? °peif } (dting Semke V■ SybaS'C 588 F-3d 501, 506-07 (7th Cir 009))), Hmzdor v. Pyramid Mouldings, Inc., 413 F. App’x 915 917 f7th r i r  iv >
z  mffcR3d rf r  („7t cir-2oo9) i
presemln^Z. p l”f  ^ ^ ' ' D  "  ADEA CaSe «f ’
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2012) (quoting Volovsek v. Wise. Dep’t ofAgr., Trade & Consumer Prot., 344 F.3d 680, 689 (7th 
Cir. 2003)); and (3) “evidence that the employer offered a pretextual reason for an adverse 
employment action,” Coleman, 667 F.3d at 860 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
“Each type of evidence is sufficient by itself (depending of course on its strength in relation to 
whatever other evidence is in the case) to support a judgment for the plaintiff; or they can be 
used together.” Troupe, 20 F.3d at 736.
A plaintiff that has failed to establish discriminatory intent under the direct method may 
nonetheless prevail under the indirect method of proof—the burden-shifting approach first 
established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Brewer, 479 F.3d at 
915. Under the indirect method of proof, a plaintiff must first establish aprima facie case of 
discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. To establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he 
was meeting the defendant’s legitimate performance expectations; (3) he suffered an adverse 
employment action; and (4) the defendant treated similarly situated employees outside of the 
protected class more favorably. Fane v. Locke Reynolds, LLP, 480 F.3d 534, 538 (7th Cir.
2007). Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, he creates a rebuttable presumption of 
employment discrimination, and the burden of production shifts to the defendant “to articulate 
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for its actions. Hong v. Children’s Mem 7 Hosp.,
993 F.2d 1257, 1261 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). If the 
defendant cannot satisfy its burden, summary judgment will be denied. See Whittaker v. N. III. 
Univ., 424 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2005). If the defendant does provide noninvidious reasons for 
its actions, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the articulated reasons were 
pretextual. Hong, 993 F.2d at 1261.
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The Seventh Circuit has found that the second and third categories of circumstantial 
evidence under the direct method (the similarly situated inquiry and pretext inquity) are similar 
to the requirements to establish a prima facie case under the indirect method, and thus the 
Court’s “analyses overlap.” Coleman, 667 F.3d at 860 n.8 (citing Egonnrnan v. Cook Cnty. 
Sheriffs Dep ;, 602 F.3d 845, 851 (7th Cir. 2010)); see also Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.Com, 
no, 476 F.3d 487,490-91 (7th Cir. 2007) (explaining that the indirect method “involves a subset 
of circumstantial evidence (including the disparate treatment of similarly situated employees) 
that conforms to the prescription of [McDonnell Douglas]”).
Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to three adverse employment actions: (1) he was 
terminated; (2) he was denied training opportunities; and (3) he was denied promotions. (R. 101, 
PL’s Mem. at 3-4, 13.) Defendant argues that the Court should not consider Plaintiffs failure to 
train claim because he did no, allege failure to train in his EEOC Charge or his complain,. (R. 
82-1, Def.'s Mem. a, 7.) A discriminator failure to train claim is distinct from a failure to 
promote claim, and therefore, failure to bain must be pleaded as a separate wrong. Maarouf v. 
Walker Mfg. Co., Dir. ofTenmco Automotive, Inc., 210 F.3d 750, 753 (7,h Cir. 2000) (citing 
Paffordv Herman, 148 F.3d 658, 669 (7ft Cir. ,998)). Plain,iff alleged in his EEOC Charge 
tha, his “management training was stopped bu, the training for younger, non-Black, non­
Nigerian Management Trainees continued.” (R. 48-1, Ex. A, EEOC Charge at 1.) Thus, the 
Court finds that Plaintiffs EEOC Charge sufficiently alleged a failure to bain claim. In additiou, 
Plaintiff alleges in his complain, tha, “[wjithin several weeks of his start, Chipotle tetminated 
[Plaintiffs] management trainingand tha, a “younger, Caucasian, and presumably American- 
born employee who started as Associate/Managemen, Trainee a, the same time as [Plaintiff] was 
allowed to continue training and ultimately promoted to General Manager of a different area
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Chipotle restaurant.” (R. 48, Am. Compl. 12-13.) Plaintiff explicitly incorporates these facts 
into Counts I, II, III, and V. {Id. 33, 39, 45, 58.) Viewing these facts and drawing all 
inferences in favor of Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff pleaded a discriminatory failure to 
train claim in the complaint, and the Court now turns to analyze the merits of Defendant’s 
motion for summary judgment on the claim.
A. Whether Plaintiffs termination was discriminatory
Plaintiff argues that he suffered an adverse employment action when he was terminated. 
(R. 101, PL’s Mem. at 13.) Plaintiff seeks to avoid summary judgment on his discriminatory 
termination claim via the direct method of proof by supplying circumstantial evidence. {Id.) 
Specifically, he argues that the facts give rise to an inference that Defendant’s reasons for 
terminating him are pretexual. {Id. ) “The employee may succeed in his demonstration of pretext 
by offering evidence that the employer’s ostensible justification is unworthy of credence.” 
Adreani v. First Colonia Bankshares Corp., 154 F.3d 389, 396 (7th Cir. 1998) (internal citations 
and quotation marks omitted). The employee may accomplish this showing with evidence 
“tending to prove that the employer’s proffered reasons are factually baseless, were not the 
actual motivation for the discharge in question, or were insufficient to motivate the discharge.”
Id. (quoting Testerman v. EDS Technical Prods. Corp., 98 F.3d 297, 303 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
“Although general averments of adequate performance are insufficient to create a factual issue 
on summary judgment even when corroborated by statements of supervisors or co-workers, a 
plaintiff may create an issue of fact by specifically refuting facts that allegedly support the 
employer’s claim of performance deficiencies.” Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 
1460 (7th Cir. 1994).
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Defendant states that it terminated Plaintiff because of his “poor performance, 
insubordination, and failure to follow basic Chipotle policies and procedures.” (R. 82-1, Def.’s 
Mem. at 9.) The position statement Defendant submitted to the EEOC states that Plaintiff was 
terminated for unexcused absences, poor performance, inability to meet Defendant’s reasonable 
expectations, violations of Defendant’s Food Safety Policies and Procedures, and 
insubordination. (R. 101, Pl.’s Mem. at 15; R. 97-4, Ex. 33, Def.’s Position Statement.) The 
termination memorandum Plaintiff received described several incidents in which Plaintiff 
violated Food Safety Policies and was insubordinate. (R. 97-3, Ex. 25, Termination Mem.) 
Plaintiff denies that any of the events described in the termination memorandum occurred—he 
denies leaving a soiled towel in the prep are on February 28,2011; he denies eating a bell pepper 
while cutting it on March 1, 2011; and he denies ctusing at Garcia and throwing dishes on M art,
4,2011. (R. 101, Pl.’s Mem. at 13.) Plaintiff points to the testimony of Guerrero, who said she
never saw Plaintiff leave a soiled towel in the prep area and could not remember if she saw 
Plaintiff eat a bell pepper while cutting it. (Id at 14.) The termination memorandum states that 
Guerrero heard Plaintiff say “God damn it,” but Guerrero testified that she never heard Plaintiff 
use profanity and never saw him throw dishes or be insubordinate. (Id. ) Plaintiff also denies the 
occurrence of other incidents that Defendant notes as examples of his poor performance, such as 
the guacamole incident, (Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. H 21), and the incident involving two cases of 
chicken, (D ef’s Rule 56.1 Resp. 123). Plaintififpoints to Arrington’s testimony describing 
Plaintiff as an “Ace in his Place” to father counter Defendant’s allegations that he was not 
meeting Defendant’s expectations. (Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. 118.) Plaintiff also offers Arrington’s 
testimony tha, Plaintiff never frightened her and that he was always professional and polite to 
counter Defendant’s assertions that Plaintiff was insubordinate. (Id.) Finally, Plaintiffcounters
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Defendant’s assertions that Plaintiff had several unexcused absences by providing time sheets 
indicating the times he clocked in, (id. f  36), and testimony that the schedules posted were not 
always the final schedules, (id. f  37).
The evidence Plaintiff offers to prove that Defendant’s reasons for firing him are 
pretextual goes beyond general assertions of adequate job performance and directly addresses the 
specific performance deficiencies identified by Defendant. The Court thus finds that Plaintiff 
has provided sufficient evidence to raise a factual issue as to whether Defendant’s justifications 
for terminating him are credible or merely a pretext for discrimination. See Dey, 28 F.3d at 1460 
(finding that a plaintiff who denied that certain events ever took place and specifically addressed 
the complaints of uncooperative behavior made by her employer presented enough evidence to 
permit a reasonable finder of fact to infer that the employer fabricated the reason for her 
dismissal).
Defendant attempts to refute Plaintiffs pretext argument by asserting that Plaintiff has 
presented no evidence that Kubicki or Triola, the individuals who made the decision to fire 
Plaintiff, did not believe the events articulated in the termination memorandum. (R. 102, Def.’s 
Reply at 9.) If the employer honestly believed its reasons for discharging the employee, the 
employee cannot meet his burden of proving pretext. Gordon v. United Airlines, Inc., 246 F.3d 
878, 889 (7th Cir. 2001). This is true even if the employer’s reasons for discharging the 
employee are “foolish or trivial or even baseless.” Id. (quoting Brill v. Lante Corp., 119 F.3d 
1266, 1270 (7th Cir. 1997). “A determination of whether a belief is honest is often conflated 
with analysis of reasonableness.” Flores v. Preferred Technical Grp., 182 F.3d 512, 516 (7th 
Cir. 1999). A court therefore does not have to take an employer at its word. Gordon, 246 F.3d 
at 889. “When an employee provides ‘a detailed refutation of events which underlie the
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employer’s negative performance assessment,’ the employee demonstrates ’that the employer 
may not have honestly relied on the identified deficiencies in making its decision.”’ Id. (quoting 
Dey, 28 F.3d at 1460-61). As discussed above, Plaintiff has provided a detailed refutation of the 
specific performance deficiencies identified by Defendant and, consequently, has demonstrated 
that Kubtckt and Triola may not have honestly relied on the deficiencies outlined in the 
termination memorandum in making their decision to terminate Plaintiff.
Because the evidence may allow a fact finder to “reasonably infer that unlawful 
discrimination was the true motivation,” Adreani, 154 F.3d at 395, Plaintiifhas met his burden 
under the direct method and avoided summary judgment on his discriminatoiy termination claim.
B disc rim in 10, rj"d "|S  decis'011 ,0 "ot promote and train Plaintiff was
Plaintiff also alleges that he suffered adverse employment actions when Defendant 
refused to promote and train him. (R. 101, Pl.’s Mem. at 3-4.) Plaintiff groups these two 
adverse actions together and presents the same circumstantial evidence to show that Defendant’s 
denial of promotion and training opportunities was discriminatory. (Id.) First, Plaintiff argues 
that throughout the time Chavez managed him, she made statements that give rise to an inference 
that she did not train or promote him because of his race, national origin, and age. (Id at 5.) 
Plaintiff points to the following statements Chavez made to him: (1) Chavez explicitly stated that 
Plaintiff was not going to be promoted; (2) Chavez called Plaintiff “Bobo,” which he alleges is a 
monkey’s name, and made fun of his accent; (3) Chavez asked Plaintiff whether he was getting 
ready to retire; and (4) after Chavez had terminated an African-American employee, she told
Plaintiff, Bob, you’re a survivor. I’ve been wanting to fire you.” (Id.) Defendant argues that
Chavez’s comments were simply stray remarks that were not made contemporaneously with any 
adverse employment action. (R. 102, Def.’s Reply at 4-5).
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“Isolated comments that are no more than ‘stray remarks’ in the workplace are 
insufficient to establish that a particular decision was motivated by discriminatory animus,” 
unless the remark was made by the decision-maker “(1) around the time of, and (2) in reference 
to, the adverse employment action.” Merillat v. Metal Spinners, Inc., 470 F.3d 685, 694 (7th Cir. 
2006) (quoting Hunt v. City o f Markham, III., 219 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000)). Because 
Plaintiff has not provided evidence to prove that Chavez made these comments during or near 
any denial of a promotion or training opportunity, the Court cannot find that these comments 
alone are sufficient to establish a discriminatory inference. However, the Court must examine 
Plaintiff s circumstantial evidence as a whole. Hobgoodv. III. Gaming Bd, 731 F.3d 635, 644 
(7th Cir. 2013) (“[Together with other facts, evidence that would be insufficient standing alone 
can be sufficient to defeat summary judgment if a reasonable jury ultimately could conclude that 
the plaintiff was the victim of illegal discrimination or retaliation.”) (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff also alleges that Chavez made statements that give rise to an inference that she 
was biased against African-Americans generally. (R. 101, PI.’s Mem. at 5.) For example, 
Plaintiff alleges that Chavez told a newly-hired African-American employee, “I hope you don’t 
get mad, but I like to make black jokes,” and that Chavez made derisive comments about 
Arrington s daughter, who is half African-American. (Id. at 6.) Further, an investigation leading 
to Chavez’s termination found that two employees had complained that Chavez made racial 
jokes about African-Americans. (Id.) The Court recognizes the comments Chavez directed at 
other employees in the protected group as one type of circumstantial evidence. Troupe, 20 F.3d 
at 736.
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Plaintiff next argues that the documentation Defendant relies on to support its reasons for 
not training or promoting Plaintiff contain serious flaws that give rise to an inference of pretext. 
(R. 101, PL's Mem. at 6.) Defendant claims that Plaintiff was not promoted because he was not 
qualified and was not meeting Defendant’s expectations. (R. 82, Def.’s Mem. at 5-7.) Plaintiff 
argues that on eleven occasions on which he allegedly committed violations of Defendant’s 
policies and procedures, he was not at work, and therefore these write-ups were fabricated. (R. 
101, Pl.’s Mem. at 6.) Defendant attempts to explain this discrepancy by asserting that “it is 
evident that Chipotle’s management simply documented instances of Plaintiffs improper
behavior and poor performance in days following the poor performance.” (R. 102, Def.’s Reply 
at 7.)
Additionally, Plaintiff provides circumstantial evidence regarding his Performance 
Discussions. Plaintiff alleges that the five Performance Discussions Defendant claims were in 
Plaintiffs personnel file were not prepared in accordance with Defendant’s policies because they 
were not signed by Plaintiff or a manager and Plaintiff never received them. (R. 101, Pi’s Mem. 
at 6.) Plaintiff cites Rudin v. Lincoln Land Cmly. Coll., 420 F.3d 712, 723 (7th Cir. 2005), for 
the proposition that a defendant’s failure to follow its own internal procedures can point to a 
discriminatory motivation. (Id.) Defendant argues that Rudin does not apply because in that 
case there were written guidelines that the employer failed to follow, whereas here there is no 
written policy requiring Defendant’s managers to obtain an employee’s signature on all 
Performance Discussions. (R. 102, Def.'s Reply, at 7.) Although there is no written policy, 
Plaintiff has provided the deposition testimony of two Human Resources employees who both 
explained that under Defendant’s policy, a manager is supposed to obtain an employee’s
signature on performance discussions. (R. 97-1, Ex. 8, Kim Dep. at 87:06-20; R. 97-1, Ex. 10,
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Tnola Dep. at 69:14-70:03.) Defendant’s distinction between this case and Kudin is therefore 
immaterial because there is a policy in place. Therefore, Defendant’s failure to follow its policy 
regarding the Performance Discussions is evidence of pretext that the Court will consider.
Plaintiff additionally alleges that the circumstances surrounding his May 2010 
performance evaluation suggest that it was prextual. (R. 101, Pl.’s Mem. at 7.) At Triola’s 
request, Chavez added more details to Plaintiff’s evaluation so that it would not appear as though 
she was “picking” on Plaintiff. (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff alleges that one specific incident described in 
the revised evaluation-where Plaintiff allegedly lost two cases of chicken due to improper 
rotating-was false. (Id.) Plaintiff argues that this “raises a question of whether, based on 
Tr,Ola’s instructions, Chavez added information to the evaluation that she knew to be false.” 4 
(Id.) Viewing Plaintiffs circumstantial evidence of pretext as a whole, the Court finds that 
Plaintiff has created a factual issue as to whether Defendant’s reasons for not promoting or 
training him are credible or pretexual. See Hobgood, 731 F.3d at 644; Palmy,hes v. City o f  
Janesville, 181 F. App’x 596, 598 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Even if the plaintiff s evidence does not 
compel the conclusion that his employer discriminated against him, if there is a question of fact 
as to the believability of an employer’s pmported reasons for an employment decision then at a 
bare minimum i, suffices to defeat the employer’s summary judgment motion.”) (quoting Rudin, 
420 F.3d at 726) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
e v i L c e ^ S r X t  (R  m i PI .‘S 0VT ! ? ! P°Siti0" Plaintiff™  hired for is further
crew member (R 102 n lf  C r S 4'7 r{ ? efendant claims that Plaintiff was hired as a
title when he w 2 hired was “c S  ” (R T ™ 4* indica,e that Plaintiff’s job
disagreement over the exact position for which Plaintiff was hired. P
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Considering all of Plaintiff s circumstantial evidence together—the evidence of pretext 
and Chavez’s statements toward Plaintiff and other African-Americans—the Court finds that 
Plaintiff has constructed a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that allows a jury to 
infer intentional discrimination. See Hobgood, 731 F.3d at 644; Troupe, 20 F.3d at 736. 
Accordingly, Plaintiff s race, national origin, and age discrimination claims (Counts I, II, III, and 
V) survive summary judgment.
II. Plaintiffs Disability Discrimination and Failure to Accommodate Claims (Counts
VIII and IX)
In Count VIII, Plaintiff alleges that he was discriminated against based on his disabilities 
in violation of the ADA when Defendant failed to promote or train him and when Defendant 
terminated his employment. (R. 48, Am. Compl. 180.) In Count IX, Plaintiff alleges that 
Defendant failed to reasonably accommodate his disabilities in violation of the ADA. (Id. f  86.) 
The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of their 
disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Discrimination under the AD A includes “not making 
reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise 
qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee,” unless the employer “can 
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the 
business. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Thus, “the ADA requires employers to reasonably 
accommodate the limitations of [their] disabled employees.” E.E.O.C. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 
417 F.3d 789, 797 (7th Cir. 2005). To invoke protection under the ADA, a plaintiff must first 
prove that he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA. Cassimy v. Bd. ofEduc. o f Rockford 
Pub. Sch, Dist. No. 205, 461 F.3d 932, 935-36 (7th Cir. 2006).
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A. Whether Plaintiffs impairments are disabilities
The ADA defines a disability as: (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially 
limits one or more major life activities of the individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or 
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). Notably, the ADA 
was amended in 2008 to make the standard for qualifying as disabled more inclusive. ADA 
Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”), Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (effective January 
1, 2009). “The question of whether an individual meets the definition of disability under [the 
ADA] should not demand extensive analysis.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c)(4). Following the 2008 
amendments to the ADA, the term “substantially limits” is to be construed broadly in favor of 
expansive coverage. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l)(i).
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs alleged medical conditions are not disabilities as defined 
by the ADA because they are “either fictitious, temporary, or do not substantially limit any major 
life activity.” (R. 82-1, Def.’s Mem. at 11-12.) Plaintiff argues that his impairments, including a 
hernia, eye disease, hypertension, and kidney disease,5 are disabilities because they 
“substantially limit him in several major life activities, including lifting, seeing, standing, and 
walking.” (R. 101, Pl.’s Mem. at 20.) Lifting, seeing, standing, and walking qualify as “major 
life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). “An impairment need not prevent, or significantly or 
severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered 
substantially limiting.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l)(ii). The question is whether a plaintiff is
5 Although Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that he suffers from a congenital heart disorder, (R. 
48, Am. Compl. 1 17), Plaintiff does not mention a congenital heart disorder along with his other 
impairments in his response to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The Court thus 
considers Plaintiffs argument that his alleged congenital heart disorder is a disability to be 
waived. See Palmer v. Marion Cnty., 327 F.3d 588, 597-98 (7th Cir. 2003) (deeming the 
plaintiffs negligence claim abandoned because he failed to delineate it in his brief in opposition 
to summary judgment); Laborers ’ Int’l Union v. Caruso, 197 F.3d 1195, 1197 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(stating that arguments not presented in response to summary judgment motions are waived).
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limited “as compared to most people in the general population.” Id Plaintiff alleges that he 
suffered from a hernia that made it very difficult for him to lift and caused him extreme pain. (R. 
101, Pl.’s Mem. at 20.) Plaintiffs doctors imposed a ten-pound lifting restriction on him, and 
Plaintiff thus contends that his hernia substantially limited him in the major life activity of 
lifting. (Id) Defendant argues that because a hernia is a temporary impairment that can be 
resolved with surgery, it cannot be substantially limiting. (R. 102, Def.’s Reply at 16.) 
Defendant’s interpretation of the law, however, is inaccurate. “The effects of an impainnent 
lasting or expected to last fewer than six months can be substantially limiting within the meaning 
of this section.” 29C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(l)(ix). In pre-ADAAA cases, the Seventh Circuit held that 
lifting restrictions were not substantial limitations. Serednyi v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 656 
■3d 540, 555 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Zahurance v. Valley Packaging Indus., Inc., 397 F. App’x 
246, 248 (7th Cir. 2010); Mays v. Principi, 301 F.3d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 2002); Mack v. Great 
Dane Traders, 308 F.3d 776, 781 (7th Cir. 2002)).<’ The Seventh Circuit has no, addressed the 
issue of whether lifting restrictions are substantial limitations under the standard outlined in the 
AD AAA. A court in this District, however, applying the AD AAA standard, found that a 
plaintiffs lifting restriction did substantially limit a major life activity. Heatherly v. Portillo's 
Ho, Dogs, Inc.. No. 11 C 8480, 2013 WL 3790909, a, •« (N.D. Ill July 19,2013) (finding tha, a 
plaintiff, who by doctor’s orders had to refrain from heavy lifting while pregnant, had presented 
sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact as to whether her high risk pregnancy rendered 
her disabled under the AD AAA). Based on this Court’s reading of the AD AAA and viewing the
The AD AAA winch went into effect on January 1, 2009, did not apply retroactivelv
Fredncksen v. United Parcel Serv., Co., 581 F 3d 516 521 n 1 /7th Tir onncn t v  ^
DC Water and Setter Auth., 572 F 3d 936 939-42 m e  C i r »  w  o * (T ng Ly“ s V
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evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiffs hernia constituted 
a disability that substantially limited the major life activity of lifting.
Plaintiff also contends that his eye disease “interferes with his vision, prevents him from 
driving, causes him headaches, makes it difficult for him to read voluminous documents, and 
causes his eye to leak fluid.” (R. 101, Pl.’s Mem. at 20.) When Plaintiff was first diagnosed 
with an eye disorder, he could not see out of his right eye. {Id.) His doctor testified that 
Plaintiffs eye sight improved over the following months, (R. 89-9, Ex. JJJ, Wongskhaluang 
Dep. at 31:1-3; 40:17-20), but as explained above, even temporary impairments can be 
substantially limiting, 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(l)(ix). Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs 
eye disease constituted a disability that substantially limited the major life activity of seeing.
Plaintiff alleges that he also suffered from hypertension and kidney disease, (R. 101, Pl.’s 
Mem. at 20), but he fails to provide evidence demonstrating how these medical conditions 
substantially limited a major life activity. Defendant, on the other hand, has provided evidence 
proving that these conditions did not substantially limit Plaintiff in any way. (R. 82-1, Def.’s 
Mem. at 12-13.) Dr. Osei and Dr. Davidovich, who both treated Plaintiff for his hypertension, 
testified that Plaintiffs hypertension did not cause him any limitations. (R. 90-1, Ex. MMM, 
Davidovich Dep. at 23:5-25:1; Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. 67-68.) Dr. Osei, who also treated 
Plaintiff for his kidney disease, testified that Plaintiffs kidneys were “still doing what [they 
were] supposed to do,” and that his kidney disease was “not that severe” and never limited him 
in any way. (PI. s Rule 56.1 Resp. f  66.) An individual is discriminated against under the ADA 
if he is subjected to an adverse action because of a perceived physical impairment, regardless of 
whether that impairment substantially limits, or is perceived to substantially limit, a major life 
activity. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1)(1). Plaintiff has provided no evidence, however, proving that
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Defendant regarded him as being impaired because of his hypertension or his kidney disease, or 
that Defendant even knew about his hypertension or kidney disease. In fact, Plaintiff denies
telling Kubicki he needed a kidney transplant or that he needed time off for his kidney to be 
tested. (PI.’s Rule 56.1 Resp.1[65.) Additionally, Triola testified that the only disabilities he 
knew Plaintiff had were a hernia and vision problems. (R. 97-1, Ex. 10, Triola Dep. at 74:5-7.)
Accordingly, the Court finds that unlike Plaintiffs hernia and eye disease, his hypertension and 
limited kidney disease are not disabilities as defined by the ADA.
B. Whether Plaintiff was discriminated against because of his disabilities
Just like for Title VII and ADEA discrimination claims, a plaintiff may prove 
discrimination in violation of the ADA using either the direct or indirect method. Timmons v. 
General Motors Corp., 469 F.3d 1122, 1126 (7th Cir. 2006). Under the direct method of proof, a 
plaintiff can present either direct or circumstantial evidence to meet his burden. Buie v. 
Quad/Graphics, Inc., 366 F.3d 496, 503 (7th Cir. 2004).
Plaintiff seeks to prove discrimination under the ADA under the direct method of proof 
through circumstantial evidence. (R. 101, PI.’s Mem. at 21.) He relies on the same 
circumstantial evidence he relied on to prove race, national origin, and age discrimination to 
similarly prove that Defendant discriminated against him based on his disabilities by failing to 
promote or train him and by terminating his employment. (Id.) Plaintiff also provides additional 
circumstantial evidence of Chavez’s statements and actions with regards to his disabilities. 
Plaintiff alleges that on one occasion, Chavez told him that he was tenninated after he had
presented a doctor’s note to her. (Id) Plaintiff then asked to speak with someone in Human 
Resouroes, and Chavez called Kubicki, who told Chavez tha, she could no. terniinate Plaintiff. 
(Id.) After hanging up with Kubicki, Chavez burst out of her office yelling expletives.and
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saying, “I can’t believe this . . .  I can’t get rid of this guy for nothing.” (Id.) On another 
occasion, Plaintiff alleges that Chavez told him, “You’re sick a lot, I don’t think this job is for 
you,” and stated that Plaintiff was too sick to work for Defendant. (Id.) Further, Chavez reduced 
Plaintiff s hours after he informed her of his vision restrictions, which prevented him from 
driving at night. (Id.) All this evidence, taken together with the evidence of pretext Plaintiff 
provides for his Title VII, Section 1981, and ADEA claims, and viewed in the light most 
favorable to Plaintiff, would permit a rational fact finder to infer that Defendant discriminated 
against Plaintiff because of his disabilities. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs 
disability discrimination claim survives summary judgment.
C. Whether Plaintiffs failure to accommodate claim is properly before the 
Court
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to reasonably accommodate his lifting restriction 
and his vision restriction. (R. 101, PI.’s Mem. at 24.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to 
adequately allege a failure to accommodate claim in his EEOC Charge and, consequently, the 
Court should dismiss any failure to accommodate claim Plaintiff now makes. (R. 82-1, Def.’s 
Mem. at 14.) Plaintiff did fail to allege a failure to accommodate claim in his EEOC Charge.
(See R. 48-1, Ex. B, EEOC Charge.) Plaintiff nonetheless argues that his failure to accommodate 
claim is properly before the Court because it is “reasonably related” to the allegations in the 
EEOC Charge. (R. 101, Pl.’s Mem. at 21-22.) The Seventh Circuit has held that “a plaintiff is 
barred from raising a claim in the district court that had not been raised in his or her EEOC 
charge unless the claim is reasonably related to one of the EEOC charges and can be expected to 
develop from an investigation into the charges actually raised.” Green v. Nat’l Steel Corp., 
Midwest Div., 197 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 1999). In his EEOC Charge, Plaintiff alleged that he 
was harassed because of his disability and stated, “I believe that I have been discriminated
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against because of my disability and retaliated against for engaging in protected activity in 
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended.” (R. 48-1, Ex. B, EEOC 
Charge at 1-2.) A discrimination claim is distinct from a failure to accommodate claim under the 
ADA. Green, 197 F.3d at 898. “Therefore, they are not like or reasonably related to one 
another, and one cannot expect a failure to accommodate claim to develop from an investigation 
into a claim that an employee was terminated because of a disability.” Id.; see Beard v. Don 
McCue Chevrolet, Inc., No. 09 C 4218, 2012 WL 2930121, at *11 (N.D. 111. July 18, 2012) 
(finding that plaintiffs failure to accommodate claim was not reasonably related to his 
discrimination claim); Kaplan v. New Trier High Sch, No. 11 C 981, 2011 WL 2148936, at *3 
(N.D. 111. May 31, 2011) (finding that a plaintiff s failure to accommodate claim was “beyond 
the scope of the charge of discrimination she filed with the EEOC”).
Plaintiff argues that he submitted a copy of the complaint he filed with Defendant’s 
Human Resources Department to the EEOC, and that this internal complaint should supplement 
the allegations in his EEOC Charge. (R. 101, Pl.’s Mem. at 22.) Written “[a]negations outside 
the body of the charge may be considered when it is clear that the charging party intended the 
agency to investigate the allegations.” Swearnigen-El v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep % 602 F.3d 
852, 865 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Vela v. Vill. o f Sauk Vill, 218 F.3d 661, 664 (7th Cir. 2000)). 
The Court finds that it is clear that in sending the EEOC a copy of his internal complaint,
Plaintiff intended the agency to investigate the allegations he made in the internal complaint. 
Therefore, the Court will consider the internal complaint as part of his EEOC Charge. But in 
examining the internal complaint, the Court finds that it does not state a charge of failure to 
accommodate. Plaintiff draws the Court’s attention to the part of the internal complaint which 
states, “against the weight requirements of my current position, I have had to lift garbage cans
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that weigh in excess of 100 lbs, as a result of which I have developed [an] inguinal hernia that is 
bothersome and painful”; he argues that this quoted language makes clear that he intended the 
EEOC to investigate a failure to accommodate claim. (R. 101, Pi 's Mem. at 22.) The Court, 
however, disagrees. To establish a failure to accommodate claim, a plaintiffmust show that: (1) 
he has a disability; (2) the employer was aware of his disability; and (3) the employer failed to 
reasonably accommodate his disability. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 417 F.3d at 797. Plaintiff did not 
state in the quoted language or in any other part of the internal complaint that he had a lifting 
restriction prescribed by his doctor. Nor does he make clear that Defendant was not 
accommodating his doctor prescribed lifting restriction. Rather Plaintiff simply states that he 
developed a hernia from lifting heavy garbage cans at work. Accordingly, the Court finds that 
Plaintiffs failure to accommodate claim must be dismissed.
HI. Plaintiffs Retaliation Claims (Counts IV, VII, and X)
In Counts IV, VII, and X, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants retaliated against him in 
violation of Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA for filing internal complaints and a Charge of 
Discrimination with the EEOC. (R. 48, Am. Compl. f l  54, 73, 92.) As with discrimination 
claims, a plaintiff may establish retaliation claims by way of either the direct or indirect method. 
Roney v. III. Dep't o f Transp., 474 F.3d 455,459 (7th Cir. 2007) (Title VII); Smith v. Lafayette 
Bank <S Trust Co., 674 F.3d 655, 657 (7,h Cir. 2012) (ADEA); Anderson v. The Foster Grp., 521 
F. Supp. 2d 758, 788 (N.D. Ilk 2007) (ADA).7 Here, Plaintiff seeks to prove his retaliation 
claims by way of the direct method. (R. 101, Pl.’s Mem. at 11-12, 16-18.) To prevail using the 
direct method of proof, Plaintiffmust present evidence, direct or circumstantial, showing that:
J
The analysis for retaliation claims is the same under Title VII the ADF A and th* a  n  a o
t h S  74 f ■3datA59\ SmitK 674 R3dat 657;thus cites relevant case law interchangeably. PP he Court
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(1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) he suffered a materially adverse action by his 
employer; and (3) a causal connection exists between the two. Silverman v. Bd. o f Educ. o f Chi., 
631 F.3d 729, 740 (7th Cir. 2011).8
It is undisputed that Plaintiff engaged in protected activities when he filed internal 
complaints in late 2009 or early 2010 and his EEOC Charge on March 5, 2010. (R. 101, Pl.’s 
Mem. at 11; R. 82-1, Def.’s Mem. at 15.) Plaintiff argues that he suffered three adverse 
employment actions in retaliation for filing these complaints: (1) Defendant failed to cross-train 
or promote him; (2) Defendant did not increase his salary after his May 2010 evaluation; and (3) 
Defendant terminated him. (R. 101, Pl.’s Mem. at 11, 14.) Defendant argues that Plaintiffs 
retaliation claims must fail as a matter of law because he cannot identify a causal link between 
his internal complaints and EEOC Charge and any adverse employment action. (R. 82-1, Def.’s 
Mem. at 15.) To establish a causal link, Plaintiff must show that his complaints were the but-for 
cause of an adverse employment action. Univ. o f Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 
2528 (2013). In other words, to survive summary judgment, Plaintiff needs to provide enough 
direct or circumstantial evidence to allow a jury to conclude that he suffered an adverse 
employment action because of his statutorily protected activity. Hobgood, 731 F.3d at 643; 
Burnell v. Gates Rubber Co., 647 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 2011).
Plaintiff filed his EEOC Charge on March 5, 2010, and he was terminated on March 11, 
2011. (R. 82-1, Def.’s Mem. at 15-16.) Defendant argues that the one-year gap between his 
EEOC Charge and his termination precludes his establishing a causal link between the two. {Id.
g
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the indirect method, Plaintiff must satisfy 
the first two elements of the direct method and further show that (1) he was meeting the 
employer’s legitimate expectations; and (2) he was treated less favorably than a similarly 
situated employee who did not engage in statutorily protected activity. Smith, 674 F.3d at 657­
58; Scruggs v. Garst Seed Co., 587 F.3d 832, 838 (7th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff does not offer any 
evidence to prove retaliation via the indirect method.
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at 16.) In order to establish a causal link and support an inference of retaliatory motive, the 
termination must have occurred “fairly soon after the employee’s protected expression.” 
Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 511 (7th Cir. 1998). One year is too long of an 
interval to allow an inference of retaliatory motive. Paluck v. Gooding Rubber Co., 221 F.3d 
1003, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000). Nevertheless, the fact that a year passed between Plaintiffs 
protected expression and his termination does not preclude him from proving retaliatory 
discharge; “instead, it means that the timing of [his] discharge, in itself, does not support an 
inference of retaliation, and [he] must come forward with other evidence.” Id.
Plaintiff argues that the evidence he presents to prove that Defendant’s reasons for 
terminating him are pretextual, as outlined in detail above, also supports an inference of 
retaliation. (R. 101, Pi’s Mem. at 17.) The Seventh Circuit has held that evidence demonstrating 
that an employer’s reasons for terminating an employee are pretextual is sufficient to create an 
inference of retaliatory motive and defeat summary judgment on a retaliatory discharge claim. 
Ajoyi v. Aramark Bus. Servs., Inc., 336 F.3d 520, 533-35 (7th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff additionally 
argues that Tnola’s regular monitoring of him following the filing of his EEOC Charge raises an 
inference of retaliation. (Id.) Triola edited Plaintiffs performance evaluation in May 2010 and 
told Chavez to include more details about Plaintiffs performance. (Id.) Triola also worked 
closely with Kubicki and Defendant’s outside counsel to prepare documentation on Plaintiff in 
the months preceding Plaintiffs termination. (Id.) Examples of this activity include: (1) on 
January 3, 2011, Triola asked Kubicki for copies of Plaintiff s recent Development Journal 
entries; (2) on January 13, 2011, Triola told Kubicki that he and Defendant’s counsel were 
drafting a Development Journal entry “to deal with the attendance issue,” and that Defendant’s 
attorney would be interviewing Kubicki and Thanawutthikom “with the sense ‘this won’t end
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well with Bob’ -  we want to be prepared”; (3) on January 20, 2011, Triola asked 
Thanawutthikom to send Plaintiff s Development Journal, restaurant schedules, and portions of 
the Dear Diary to Defendant’s counsel; and (4) on March 8, 2011, in response to Kubicki’s 
report that there was only one Development Journal entry since the beginning of the year, Triola 
responded, “Yah, not good.” (Id. at 17-18.) Plaintiff argues that Triola’s actions “suggest that 
Defendant indeed began gathering documentation to justify Plaintiffs termination before the 
events in the termination memo allegedly occurred.” (Id at 18.) Defendant responds that this 
evidence is “nothing more than proof Triola was adequately performing his duties as Human 
Resource Director.” (R. 102, Def.’s Mem. at 17.)
In addition to the evidence of Triola’s monitoring, Plaintiff also offers evidence that 
Chavez told other managers to “document every little thing Plaintiff did wrong” after she found 
out about Plaintiff s internal complaints. (R. 101, Pl.’s Mem. at 11.) And after Chavez found 
out about Plaintiffs EEOC Charge, Chavez was “freaking out” and “ranting” about it, and said 
that Plaintiff “had to go.” (Id. ) Between February and March 2010, Chavez and other managers 
made six entries in Plaintiff s Development Journal and seventeen entries in the Oak Park 
Restaurant’s Dear Diary about Plaintiffs alleged performance problems. (Id. at 12.)
The parties did not provide and this Court was unable to find Seventh Circuit precedent 
on the issue of increased monitoring of an employee following the filing of an EEOC Charge. A 
court in this District has held, however, that “the pronounced increase in negative reviews and 
the careful scrutiny of plaintiff s performance, coupled with testimony suggesting that 
management personnel were acutely aware of plaintiff s EEOC charge, is sufficient to establish a 
causal link for plaintiff s prima facie case of retaliatory discharge.” Flanagan v. Office o f Chief 
Judge o f Circuit Court o f Cook Cnty., III., No. 06 C 1462, 2007 WL 2875726, at *13 (N.D. 111.
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Sept. 28, 2007) (quoting Weaver v. Casa Gallardo, Inc., 922 F.2d 1515, 1525 (11th Cir. 1991)) 
(the intense monitoring of plaintiffs work, which “was clearly abnormal, bespeaks a retaliatory 
motive”). Here, as in Flanagan, Plaintiffs managers, who were aware of Plaintiff s EEOC 
Charge, increased their monitoring of Plaintiff s performance and increased the frequency in 
which they documented his alleged deficiencies. According to Arrington, this was all done in an 
effort to terminate Plaintiff. Thus, the Court finds that viewed in the light most favorable to 
Plaintiff, the evidence he presents is sufficient to establish a causal link between Plaintiffs 
internal complaints and EEOC Charge and his termination, and it therefore raises an inference of 
retaliatory motive.
Plaintiff also argues that Defendant retaliated against him by denying him a raise after his 
May 2010 evaluation and by denying him promotion and cross-training opportunities. (R. 101, 
Pl.’s Mem. at 11.) The Seventh Circuit has held that a plaintiff cannot establish a causal 
connection where “the allegedly retaliatory conduct was merely the continuation of the conduct 
giving rise to the complaints.” McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 259 (7th Cir. 1996); see 
also Johnson v. Nordstrom, Inc., 260 F.3d 727, 735 (7th Cir. 2002). There needs to be a 
“ratcheting up” of any alleged discriminatory conduct after a plaintiff files his complaints. 
Cisneros, 84 F.3d at 259. Here, Plaintiff filed his internal complaints and EEOC Charge 
precisely because he was not getting promoted or cross-trained and was not receiving a raise, and 
he felt this was discriminatory treatment. (R. 101, Pl.’s Mem. at 11.) After he filed his 
complaints and EEOC Charge, he continued to be denied a promotion and cross-training 
opportunities and he continued to be denied a raise until November 2010. (R. 102, Def.’s Resp. 
at 18-19.) Because Plaintiff has not alleged any new or increased discriminatory treatment, and
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has only alleged the continuation of the conduct he already complained about, the Court finds no 
evidence of retaliation.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff s retaliation claims based on his termination 
survive summary judgment, but his retaliation claims based on his continual denial of a raise, 
promotions, and cross-training opportunities do not survive summary judgment.
IV. Plaintiffs State Law Retaliatory Discharge Claim (Count VI)
In Count VI, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant terminated him in retaliation for filing a 
claim for workers’ compensation benefits. (R. 48, Am. Compl. ffl 65-67.) In Illinois it is 
unlawful to terminate an employee in retaliation for exercising his rights under the Illinois 
Workers’ Compensation Act (IWCA). Gordon v. FedEx Freight, Inc., 674 F.3d 769, 773 (7th 
Cir. 2012) (citing Palmateer v. Int’l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878-79 (111. 1981)). A 
plaintiff claiming retaliatory discharge for filing a workers’ compensation claim must show: (1) 
that he was employed by the defendant before the injury; (2) that he exercised a right granted by 
the IWCA, and (3) that the discharge is causally related to the filing of the workers’ 
compensation claim. Clemons v. Meek Devices Co., 704 N.E.2d 403, 406 (111. 1998). Here, the 
first two elements are not in dispute. (R. 82-1, Def.’s Mem. at 19; R. 101, Pl.’s Mem. at 25.) 
Plaintiff injured his hip and arm while taking out the garbage at work on December 23, 2010, 
and Thanawutthikom filed a workers’ compensation claim on behalf of Plaintiff on January 14, 
2011. (R. 101, PI. s Mem. at 24; Pl.’s Rule 56.1 Resp. 79.) Thus, the only issue is whether 
Plaintiff can establish that a causal relationship exists between his exercise of a right granted by 
the IWCA and his termination.
The Seventh Circuit has held that in deciding motions for summary judgment on Illinois 
retaliatory discharge claims, federal courts are to follow Illinois law rather than the federal
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McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach in determining whether a plaintiff has met his 
burden on causation. Gacek v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 614 F.3d 298, 303 (7th Cir. 2010). 
Accordingly, a plaintiff may not survive summary judgment “merely by proving that the reasons 
given by [Defendant] for firing him were unworthy of belief,” as he would under the McDonnell 
Douglas framework. Id. Instead, to establish a causal relationship, a plaintiff “must 
affirmatively show that the discharge was primarily in retaliation for his exercise of a protected 
right.” Roger v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 21 F.3d 146, 149 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Marin v. Am. 
Meat Packing Co., 562 N.E.2d 282, 285 (111. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1990)). To do so, a plaintiff must 
“proffer sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that the employer was 
improperly motivated.” FedEx Freight, 674 F.3d at 774 (quoting Roger, 21 F.3d at 149); see 
Hartlein v. III. Power Co., 601 N.E.2d 720, 730 (111. 1992) (“Concerning the element of 
causation, the ultimate issue to be decided is the employer’s motive in discharging the 
employee.”). Here, Plaintiff argues that the facts suggest that Defendant’s motive in terminating 
Plaintiff was pretextual. (R. 101, PI.’s Mem. at 25.) A pretext argument alone, however, is not 
enough to establish the element of causation. Gacek, 614 F.3d at 303; see Robinson v. Stanley, 
No. 06 C 5158, 2011 WL 3876903, at *6 (N.D. 111. Aug. 31, 2011) (granting summary judgment 
on plaintiffs state law retaliatory discharge claim because plaintiff did not provide any evidence 
of causation and instead simply argued that defendants’ proffered reason for terminating her 
employment was a pretext for retaliatory discharge). Plaintiff offers no evidence to demonstrate 
that Defendant’s actual motivation for terminating him was his filing of a workers’ compensation 
claim as opposed to Defendant’s general discriminatory animus against Plaintiff. Plaintiffs 
unsupported allegations of pretext, with respect to his termination for filing a workers’ 
compensation claim, are insufficient to survive summary judgment on this specific claim.
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Plaintiff further notes that when he returned to work on February 10, 2011, after 
recovering from his workplace accident, he asked Thanawutthikom to be paid for the days he 
missed. (R. 101, Pl.’s Mem. at 25.) He was terminated on March 11, 2011, and Plaintiff argues 
that this short time frame between his request for compensation and his termination raises an 
inference of causation. (Id.) The Seventh Circuit has identified three ways recognized in Illinois 
law by which an employee may exercise a right under the IWCA: (1) where an employee files a 
workers compensation claim; (2) where an employee is preemptively fired to prevent such a 
filing; and (3) where an employee merely requests and seeks medical attention. FedEx Freight, 
674 F.3d at 773 (collecting and analyzing Illinois caselaw). Thus, requesting compensation from 
an employer for days missed is not a protected right under the IWCA. Plaintiff cannot establish 
a retaliatory discharge claim based on his request for compensation for the time he missed work 
due to his injury.
“The causality requirement calls for more than a sequential connection.” Roger, 21 F.3d 
at 149; see also FedEx Freight, 674 F.3d at 775. Therefore, the short time frame between the 
filing of Plaintiff s workers’ compensation claim and his termination (two months) alone is not 
enough to infer that Defendant was improperly motivated. Because Plaintiff cannot satisfy the 
causation element, his state law retaliatory discharge claim cannot survive summary judgment.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (R. 82) is 
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Court grants summary judgment on Count VI and 
denies summary judgment on Counts I, II, III, IV, V, VII, VIII, and X. The Court dismisses 
Count IX. The parties are directed to exhaust all settlement possibilities for the remaining claims 
prior to the next status hearing, which will be held on January 30, 2014, at 10:00 a.m., to set a 
firm trial date.
Chief Judge Ruben Castillo 
United States District Court
Dated: January 15, 2014
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